

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction: Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents—Contributions to Social Ontology</b> .....	<b>1</b>
	Anita Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid	
<b>Part I Intentionality and Institutions</b>		
<b>2</b>	<b>Document Acts</b> .....	<b>19</b>
	Barry Smith	
<b>3</b>	<b>Searlean Reflections on Sacred Mountains</b> .....	<b>33</b>
	Filip Buekens	
<b>4</b>	<b>Social Objects without Intentions</b> .....	<b>53</b>
	Brian Epstein	
<b>5</b>	<b>The Logical Form of Totalitarianism</b> .....	<b>69</b>
	Jennifer Hudin	
<b>6</b>	<b>Groups, Normativity and Disagreement</b> .....	<b>81</b>
	Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brigido	
<b>7</b>	<b>Joint Actions, Social Institutions and Collective Goods: A Teleological Account</b> .....	<b>99</b>
	Seumas Miller	
<b>8</b>	<b>Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality. A Taxonomy in Social Ontology</b> .....	<b>117</b>
	Francesca De Vecchi	
<b>Part II Shared Emotions and Recognition</b>		
<b>9</b>	<b>Emergence and Empathy</b> .....	<b>141</b>
	Ronald de Sousa	

<b>10</b>	<b>The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups</b> .....	159
	Mikko Salmela	
<b>11</b>	<b>Feelings of Being-Together and Caring-With</b> .....	177
	H. Andrés Sánchez Guerrero	
<b>12</b>	<b>Joining the Background: Habitual Sentiments Behind We-Intentionality</b> .....	195
	Emanuele Caminada	
<b>13</b>	<b>Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others</b> .....	213
	Arto Laitinen	
<b>14</b>	<b>The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership</b> .....	229
	Titus Stahl	
 <b>Part III Collective Reasons and Group Agency</b>		
<b>15</b>	<b>Acting over Time, Acting Together</b> .....	247
	Michael E. Bratman	
<b>16</b>	<b>How Where We Stand Constrains Where I Stand: Applying Bratman's Account of Self-Governance to Collective Action</b> .....	263
	Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko	
<b>17</b>	<b>Team Reasoning and Shared Intention</b> .....	279
	Abraham Sesshu Roth	
<b>18</b>	<b>Collective Intentionality and Practical Reason</b> .....	297
	Juliette Gloor	
<b>19</b>	<b>The SANE Approach to Real Collective Responsibility</b> .....	313
	Sara Rachel Chant	
<b>20</b>	<b>Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?</b> .....	329
	András Szigeti	
<b>21</b>	<b>Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit Theory</b> .....	343
	Vuko Andric	
<b>22</b>	<b>Direct and Indirect Common Belief</b> .....	355
	Emiliano Lorini and Andreas Herzig	